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Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network

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Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network paper | Isidor Zeuner | Jan 22 2015 /r/bitcoin_devlist

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Not new news, but still interesting - Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network

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Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network paper | Isidor Zeuner | Jan 22 2015

Isidor Zeuner on Jan 22 2015:
Hi there,
some thoughts in-line:
Finally, distributors of consumer wallets can use this research in
order to distribute their wallet with policies which may be less prone
to Tor-specific attacks. Or leave this out altogether if their
audience has different expectations for connecting to Bitcoin.
Sure. I guess there will be wallets for all kinds of people in future,
sharing a common core that they can customise (this is certainly the vision
and general direction for bitcoinj, and it's working out OK).
To clarify, my comments above were for mainstream granny-focused wallets.
Wallets designed for crypto geeks can and should expose all the knobs to
let people run wild.
I hear that. But I don't see why mainstream wallets and wallets
designed for crypto research should not share a common core. Nor do I
understand why having a common core for different types of wallets
should be reserved for BitcoinJ.
When Bitcoin was pretty new, having a less customizable core did
probably have more of a merit in order to achieve network stability
through monoculture. But as of today, Bitcoin has proven itself as
being capable of allowing a variety of client application to run on
the network, so why should the reference implementation not reflect
this kind of diversity? The policy the mainstream distribution imposes
upon the core can still be rather restrictive.
One possible direction to go is to use Tor for writing to the network and
use general link encryption and better Bloom filtering for reading it. Thus
new transactions would pop out of Tor exits, but there isn't much they can
do that's malicious there except mutate them or block them entirely. If you
insert the same transaction into the P2P network via say 10 randomly chosen
exits, the worst a malicious mutator can do is race the real transaction
and that's no different to a malicious P2P node. Even in a world where an
attacker has DoS-banned a lot of nodes and now controls your TX submission
path entirely, it's hard to see how it helps them.
It might deserve some research in order to determine how Tor's
privacy guarantees might be impacted if we allow attackers to mess
around with exit node choices in a rather predictable and low-cost
manner. Unfortunately, I can't think of another (non-Bitcoin)
application which puts Tor to a similar test.
The nice thing about the above approach is that it solves the latency
problems. Startup speed is really an issue for reading from the network:
just syncing the block chain is already enough of a speed hit without
adding consensus sync as well. But if you're syncing the block chain via
the clearnet you can connect to Tor in parallel so that by the time the
user has scanned a QR code, verified the details on the screen and then
pressed the Pay button, you have a warm connection and can upload the TX
through that. It reduces the level of startup time optimisation needed,
although Tor consensus download is still too slow even to race a QR code
scan at the moment. I think tuning the consensus caching process and
switching to a fresh one on the fly might be the way to go.
I do agree that hybrid clearnet/Tor approaches come with interesting
performance properties.
When BIP70 is in use, you wouldn't write the tx to the network yourself but
you could download the PaymentRequest and upload the Payment message via an
SSLd Tor connection to the merchant. Then malicious exits can only DoS you
but not do anything else so there's no need for multiple exit paths
BIP70 is interesting, indeed, although I still fail to understand why
(according to the specs I saw) the PaymentRequest message is signed,
but not the Payment message.
But in context of the discussed protocol issues, I think it just moves
the issue from the payer to the payee, so it may or may not partially
relieve network-related issues, depending on the usage scenario.
Best regards,
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Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network

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Dandelion++: Lightweight Cryptocurrency Networking with Formal Anonymity Guarantees

Date: 2018-05-28
Author(s): Giulia Fanti, Shaileshh Bojja Venkatakrishnan, Surya Bakshi, Bradley Denby, Shruti Bhargava, Andrew Miller, Pramod Viswanath

Link to Paper

Recent work has demonstrated significant anonymity vulnerabilities in Bitcoin's networking stack. In particular, the current mechanism for broadcasting Bitcoin transactions allows third-party observers to link transactions to the IP addresses that originated them. This lays the groundwork for low-cost, large-scale deanonymization attacks. In this work, we present Dandelion++, a first-principles defense against large-scale deanonymization attacks with near-optimal information-theoretic guarantees. Dandelion++ builds upon a recent proposal called Dandelion that exhibited similar goals. However, in this paper, we highlight simplifying assumptions made in Dandelion, and show how they can lead to serious deanonymization attacks when violated. In contrast, Dandelion++ defends against stronger adversaries that are allowed to disobey protocol. Dandelion++ is lightweight, scalable, and completely interoperable with the existing Bitcoin network. We evaluate it through experiments on Bitcoin's mainnet (i.e., the live Bitcoin network) to demonstrate its interoperability and low broadcast latency overhead.

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TxProbe: Discovering Bitcoin's Network Topology Using Orphan Transactions

Date: 2018-12-10
Author(s): Sergi Delgado-Segura, Surya Bakshi, Cristina Pérez-Solà, James Litton, Andrew Pachulski, Andrew Miller, Bobby Bhattacharjee

Link to Paper

Bitcoin relies on a peer-to-peer overlay network to broadcast transactions and blocks. From the viewpoint of network measurement, we would like to observe this topology so we can characterize its performance, fairness and robustness. However, this is difficult because Bitcoin is deliberately designed to hide its topology from onlookers. Knowledge of the topology is not in itself a vulnerability, although it could conceivably help an attacker performing targeted eclipse attacks or to deanonymize transaction senders. In this paper we present TxProbe, a novel technique for reconstructing the Bitcoin network topology. TxProbe makes use of peculiarities in how Bitcoin processes out of order, or "orphaned" transactions. We conducted experiments on Bitcoin testnet that suggest our technique reconstructs topology with precision and recall surpassing 90%. We also used TxProbe to take a snapshot of the Bitcoin testnet in just a few hours. TxProbe may be useful for future measurement campaigns of Bitcoin or other cryptocurrency networks.

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  3. Biryukov, A., Pustogarov, I.: Bitcoin over tor isn’t a good idea. In: Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. pp. 122–134. SP ’15, IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC, USA (2015),
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  14. Neudecker, T., Hartenstein, H.: Could network information facilitate address clustering in bitcoin? In: Brenner, M., Rohloff, K., Bonneau, J., Miller, A., Ryan, P.Y., Teague, V., Bracciali, A., Sala, M., Pintore, F., Jakobsson, M. (eds.) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. pp. 155–169. Springer International Publishing, Cham (2017)
  15. Newman, M.E.: The structure and function of complex networks. SIAM review 45(2), 167–256 (2003)
  16. Nick, J.: Guessing bitcoin’s p2p connections. (2015)
  17. The Bitcoin Core developers: Bitcoin core 0.10.1 release notes. (april 2015)
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A slightly overboard response to my threat model.

For what I hope are obvious reasons, I don't want, and probably will never post my threat model publicly online. However, regardless of that, what I'm sure you will extrapolate from this post is that I live my life, digitally in particular, with a fairly high level threat model. This is not because I'm some super sophisticated criminal mastermind, but rather, I am at this level because I genuinely love playing around with this stuff. And I just happen to understand the importance of privacy and just how vital it is to a truly healthy society. I would like to extend a thanks to ProgressiveArchitect for the sharing of the knowledge they have done on this subreddit, /privacytoolsio, and the like. We may have never interacted, but nevertheless, your input into this community is truly interesting and extremely informative and educating. I'm sure those of you familiar with PA's setup will be able to draw some parallels with mine and their's.
Thank you.
I hope you all enjoy reading this write up.
I run Qubes OS on a Lenovo ThinkPad X230 laptop. Specs for it are as following: - i7-3520M - 16GB RAM - 1TB Samsung 860 Evo SSD - Qualcomm Atheros AR9285 wireless card
Additionally, I used a Raspberry Pi Model 3B+ and a Pomono SPI clip to replace the stock BIOS firmware with coreboot+me_cleaner. This wasn't done out of any "real" concern for the Intel ME (though of course proprietary black-boxes like it should be avoided at all costs and not trusted), but rather for open source enthusiasm and for increased security and faster boot times than what the stock BIOS firmware allows for. On that note about the ME, I don't believe the conspiracy theories that claim that it is a state-sponsored attack method for surveillance. I believe that Intel had good intentions for improving the lives of IT professionals who need to manage hundreds, if not thousands of remote machines. However, it has proven time and time again to be insecure, and I don't need the remote management and the "features" that it provides on my machines.
In Qubes, I use a combination of AppVMs and StandaloneVMs for a variety of different purposes. All VMs use PVH over HVM, except for the Mirage Unikernel Firewall, which uses PV, and the sys-net and sys-usb StandaloneVMs which have to use HVM because of PCI device passthrough. Right now most of my VMs are AppVMs, but for maintenance and compartmentalization reasons, I am considering moving more towards StandaloneVMs, despite the increase in disk space and bandwidth usage for updates.
General route of from Qubes to the Internet for anonymous browsing, general private browsing, accessing Uni services, and Uni-related anonymous browsing respectively: 1. Qubes->sys-mirage-firewall->sys-vpn-wg->sys-corridor->sys-whonix->whonix-ws-15-dvm to the internet. 2. Qubes->sys-mirage-firewall->sys-vpn-wg to the Internet. 3. Qubes->sys-mirage-firewall->uni-vpn-wg to the Internet. 4. Qubes->sys-mirage-firewall->uni-vpn-wg->uni-corridor->uni-whonix->uni-anon-research to the Internet.

(Note: the VPN name is substituted in the "vpn" above. I had to remove it to comply with this subreddit's rules. It is easy to identify what VPN it is as it randomly generates a long numaric string and has fantastic support for WireGuard.)

Web Browsers: - Tor Browser (primary) in a disposable Whonix VM. - Firefox (secondary) with the about:config changes listed on and the following extensions: Cookies AutoDelete, Decentraleyes, HTTPS Everywhere, uBlock Origin (advance user, all third party content blocked and JavaScript disabled), and Vim Vixen. Used in my personal AppVM. - Ungoogled Chromium (Uni only) with standard uBlock Origin and cVim. Used only for Uni-related access in my uni-campus and uni-home AppVMs.
Search Engine: SearX, Startpage, and DuckDuckGo.
Password Manager: KeePassXC.
Office: LibreOffice.
Notes: Standard Notes.
Messaging: Signal Desktop.
Media Playback: mpv.
Emails: I access my personal email within my personal Qubes domain and my Uni email using my Uni Qubes domains. My emails are downloaded to a local repository using isync, send using msmtp, and read using neomutt with html emails converted to plain text using w3m. Emails are sent in plain text too. All of the attachments in the emails (PDFs mostly) are automatically opened in DisposableVMs.
My personal Posteo email account has incoming encryption setup. This means that I emailed my public GPG key to an address correlated to my actual Posteo email address so that all email that I receive is encrypted with my public key and can only be decrypted using my private key. So even if my emails were intercepted and/or my account broken into, the contents of them are safe since they are encrypted as soon as they hit Posteo's servers.
I have setup a number of Posteo aliases that are completely segregated from the email I used to register my account. One of those is considered my "professional" email for my current job. I have another couple aliases, one dedicated for 33mail and another dedicated for Abine Blur. I make use of 33mail alias addresses for catch-all email addresses for registering for accounts that need to be under a username associated with my name anyways. This is for purposes like putting different compartmentalized, but still related emails to put onto my Resume. I use a different alias for each Resume I put out online. That way, when that information gets sold, traded, etc., I can easily trace it back to who sold the information. For example, if I applied for a job online that required me to go through the process of registering an account through a third-party, say 'xyz Inc', the address I would register that account with would be [email protected], or something along those lines. Abine Blur is used much in the same manner but for accounts that don't need to be associated with my real name in any way, say online shopping on Amazon that I do under an many aliases, then ship to various address that I don't live at, but that I can visit with no problems. I use a different Blur address with each service like with 33mail for the same reasoning shown above.
The passwords for the accounts are encrypted and stored locally in each of the domains, however, my private key is stored in my vault domain, so even if an adversary were to compromise the domains, they wouldn't be able to steal my private key without exploiting the hypervisor. They would only be able to wait for me to authorize the usage of my private key in that domain, and even then, it could only be used to decrypt files. That is a concern that they can use my private key to decrypt messages, but they wouldn't be able to steal the key. With my personal email, the emails would also be encrypted locally anyway so they wouldn't be able to read them. My Uni email, in contrast, uses Outlook unfortunately, so there isn't any option to enable incoming encryption, and even if it was, I'm not sure how private it would be anyways.
For those looking for an in depth list of all my VMs, with explanations for the more obscure ones, I have listed them below. I have got a lot of templates, hence why I am considering moving over to StandaloneVMs, but as of right now:




Phone: Motorola Moto G5s running Lineage OS 16.0 Pie no G-Apps or micro-G with the following Apps: - AdAway: Open Source hosts file-based ad blocker. (Requires root.) - AFWall+: Linux iptables front end. (Requires root.) - Amaze: File manager. - andOPT: 2FA app. I like it since it can export the entries to an AES encrypted file. - AntennaPod: Podcast manager. - AnySoftKeyboard - Simple Calendar - Simple Contacts Pro - DAVx5: CalDav syncronization with my calendar on my Posteo email account. - F-Droid - Fennec F-Droid: Web Browser. Has the same Firefox addons like on Qubes minus Vim Vixen. I used the app Privacy Settings to configure the about:config. - KeePassDX: Password manager. - KISS launcher - Magisk Manager - NewPipe: YouTube app replacement. - S.Notes: Standard Notes. - OsmAnd~: Maps and navigation. - Red Moon: Blue light filter. - SELinuxModeChanger: Exactly as it sounds. (Requires root.) - Shelter: Work profile manager. - Signal: Messaging. - Vinyl Music Player: Music player. - WireGuard: VPN protocol frontend. Is configured to use my VPN account. Is setup as an always-on and connected VPN.
As mentioned, I use Shelter to manage my work profile. In it I isolate the following apps: - Clover: *chan browser. - Orbot: For routing apps through Tor. Is setup as an always-on and connected VPN. - RedReader: Reddit client. - Tor Browser
Over the last several years, I have started using my phone less and less and taking advantage of less of what it has got to offer. I don't check email on my device. I have no real need to browse the Internet on it outside of watching videos using NewPipe, browsing Reddit, and various *chan boards.
On the Smart Phone side of things, I am considering purchasing an older used iPhone SE or 6S for use with MySudo when outside of my home as well as an iPod Touch for use on WiFi only for use inside my home. The iPhone would be kept inside of a faraday bag when I am at home and not using it. It would also be kept in the faraday bag whenever at home to avoid associating that device with my home address. The iPod Touch would be used for MySudo calls instead.
Future outlook and plan for my privacy and security:
To avoid as much deanonymisation of my privacy as possible, I'm only going to specify enough so that anyone reading this can get the jist of my situation in life. I am quite young (age 16 to 25) and I started along this privacy journey when I was even younger. I was never a very heavy social media user, however I did have an online presence if you looked hard enough. My name fortunately is a very common and short name, so that does help to bury information that I was not able to remove further in the vast trenches that is the Internet.
On the digital side of things, I mentioned that I have a dedicated Crypto AppVM for handling crypto currency transactions using Bisq. I have setup a dedicated bank account that I have periodically been transferring money into so that I can trade crypto. Unfortunately, I do not live in the US, so being able to effectively start trades with others is more difficult. I also do not have access to a credit card masking account like (that I absolutely would use given the ability). I plan on getting an anonymous VPS to host my own Tor exit node for better speeds and to mitigate the possibility of malicious exit nodes. The country I live in has been a proponent of absolute dragnet surveillance on all activities occurring online and in real life, though the former is far more visible on this subreddit. I will be using crypto with cleaned Bitcoin (as seen with ProgressiveArchitect's setup) for purchasing my VPN service, etc.
With future hardware, to replace my aging laptop, I am very hopeful for Xen, then eventually Qubes OS getting ported to Power9. When that happens I'll be getting a Raptor Computing Blackbird as a desktop. Maybe in the future I'll get a Purism Librem laptop, but for now my corebooted X230 works perfectly for my use cases. On that note, I have successfully build the Heads firmware for the X230 and I was able to get the minimal 4MB image flashed on my laptop. I did revert it back to my coreboot setup after playing around a little with it, and unfortunately I haven't had time since to do a full, complete flash of it.
On the physical/real life side of things, I plan on making use of various Trusts in order to hold assets, say to keep my name from being immediately visible on the title of my car. As of right now I am fortunate enough to have the title of my car under the name of someone who I trust. Unless I am legally required, and where there are immediate and absolute consequences, I use fake names in real life. With Uni, I am enrolled under my real name and address. This is a requirement and it is verified, so there is nothing that I can realistically do about it. As for other services, I plan on setting up a personal mailbox (PMB), etc if possible to use as a real, physical address that is associated with my real name and that is used for things like Government issued ID. In the future when I move again, I plan on renting a place in cash to try and keep my name dissociated with my real address. For those looking for reasoning on why one would want to do that, please read How to be Invisible by J.J. Luna. It's truly the Bible of physical privacy.
At this stage I am just going off on a ramble, so I should cut it short here.
I have just started and I live for this shit.
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Subreddit Stats: Bitcoin top posts from 2018-09-06 to 2019-09-05 13:10 PDT

Period: 363.83 days
Submissions Comments
Total 999 158891
Rate (per day) 2.75 432.86
Unique Redditors 769 35151
Combined Score 1413095 1016159

Top Submitters' Top Submissions

  1. 36719 points, 1 submission: khaotickk
    1. Quick, upvote this to confuse everyone into thinking the price jumped back up. (36719 points, 585 comments)
  2. 31798 points, 24 submissions: Kashpantz
    1. When you forget about money in a bank account and soon realise that cash you had in the bank was never yours to begin with... (3007 points, 311 comments)
    2. When you realise no bank or government can stop you from using the hardest money known to mankind. (2843 points, 404 comments)
    3. What crypto looks like to people who needs it the most. Venezuela. (2811 points, 447 comments)
    4. The Fear Of The Market Going Down Manipulates The User To Make The Wrong Decision. (2615 points, 432 comments)
    5. They say Bitcoin is for money laundering, buying drugs and criminals.... (2480 points, 380 comments)
    6. Why would anyone create an amazing protocol and go to so much effort to protect their identity only to come back 10 years later to start suing people because they don't believe you? (2304 points, 220 comments)
    7. When a Central Bank Braggs About Having the Ability to Create More Money Out of Thin Air. Is this a joke? (1355 points, 471 comments)
    8. Thanks to Bitcoin, People Have Taken An Interest In Markets, Investing, Charting and Fundamentals. (1325 points, 145 comments)
    9. History Made! The First Cannabis to Bitcoin Trade! (1312 points, 155 comments)
    10. Bitcoin Promotes Renewable Energy (1241 points, 242 comments)
  3. 26785 points, 1 submission: BV5A6cx9NBZU78jDGG3t
    1. I wonder if we upvote this, is there a chance trading bots get confused and start buying? (26785 points, 357 comments)
  4. 16658 points, 1 submission: gth3q
    1. Sold my portfolio today and got myself a LAMBO!!! (16658 points, 351 comments)
  5. 16348 points, 2 submissions: cryptograffiti
    1. Upvote to get this to the top search result for "Bitcoin CEO." (15046 points, 257 comments)
    2. I sold this tiny artwork for 1 millisatoshi ($0.000000037) - story in comments (1302 points, 134 comments)
  6. 13530 points, 6 submissions: Greentoboggan
    1. I'm never wrong (4142 points, 183 comments)
    2. Yeah, What Cameron Said! (2643 points, 135 comments)
    3. Deal 'em (2384 points, 162 comments)
    4. That exit tho (2295 points, 78 comments)
    5. Two Trillion a Year (1473 points, 87 comments)
    6. The Daily Routine (593 points, 49 comments)
  7. 12560 points, 11 submissions: DesignerAccount
    1. Ancient Chinese lore (2886 points, 57 comments)
    2. Cybercash, as imagined in 1998 (2068 points, 190 comments)
    3. The real hodlers path to the moon (2025 points, 100 comments)
    4. REKT: US Copyright Office Says It Does Not ‘Recognize’ Craig Wright as Satoshi (1509 points, 103 comments)
    5. What if... (747 points, 134 comments)
    6. Insider leaks: Jihan is stepping down feom CEO role as he sees high probability of bankruptcy, decreasing personal liability! Early estimates for Bitmain 2018 Profits is USD1.2bn LOSS!!! (728 points, 218 comments)
    7. If you have recently received a very small amount of BTC in your wallet unexpectedly, you may be the target of a "dusting attack" designed to deanonymise you by linking your inputs together - Samourai users can mark this utxo as "Do Not Spend" to nip the attack in the bud. (708 points, 220 comments)
    8. 10yrs ago today, the first Bitcoin block. Turns out it was a pretty big deal (488 points, 30 comments)
    9. On 1/19 one of the most popular cocktail lounges in Chicago will become a fully sovereign bitcoin accepting business on LN by simply plugging in a box and downloading software... If you're in the area, go watch the demo!! (482 points, 108 comments)
    10. PSA: Gemini is full on with native SegWit!!! (And uses Blockstream's block explorer....) (476 points, 103 comments)
  8. 12386 points, 1 submission: uasili4
    1. Those mountains (12386 points, 212 comments)
  9. 11209 points, 11 submissions: Suberg
    1. Time Magazine Says 'Bitcoin Matters For Freedom' (1722 points, 147 comments)
    2. BTC Price Up Nearly 50% Since US Congressman Urged to 'Ban Bitcoin' (1554 points, 142 comments)
    3. Twitter CEO to Joe Rogan: I Think Currency of The Internet Will Be Bitcoin (1502 points, 224 comments)
    4. They'll buy BTC at $30k - NOT $3K - People Only Want to Buy Bitcoin After Price Rises, Google Data Shows (1473 points, 270 comments)
    5. BREAKING: Morgan Stanley To Give Clients Bitcoin Trading Options (1020 points, 106 comments)
    6. Tony Robbins tells 3+ million followers that Bitcoin has "No single bank, government, company or individual owns the network or has control over it - " you're account can't be frozen" (933 points, 93 comments)
    7. Andrew Yang is the Bitcoin-Friendly U.S. 2020 Presidential Candidate (800 points, 566 comments)
    8. Jack Dorsey: Lightning Coming To Square Cash App Is 'When', Not 'If' (684 points, 79 comments)
    9. Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey Shows Off His (Casa) Bitcoin Full Node (594 points, 83 comments)
    10. Lightning Network Passes 4000 Nodes, Reaches All-Time Capacity High - (497 points, 67 comments)
  10. 9115 points, 6 submissions: Pascalboyart
    1. Yesterday I received 1 bitcoin on my street art QR codes donation adress! After one year and 3 frescoes in Paris: 1,14 btc received (+ 5 bch and 1,25 ltc) in total! Thanks to the crypto community for your generosity, this space is full of suprises 🤩👍🏻Can't wait to do more murals to spread crypto! (3379 points, 178 comments)
    2. Already 0.01btc ($85) received on my new street art qr code in 24 hours, thanks guys! 🙏🏻 (1942 points, 186 comments)
    3. This portrait of Satoshi Nakamoto is made of real US Dollars ripped and glued on canvas 💸💸💸 (1808 points, 355 comments)
    4. This portrait of Hal Finney is made of real $USD (1 to 100 bills 💸) ripped and glued on canvas by the french artist @pascalboyart 🎨 This work is a part of the serie "Who's Satoshi?" exhibited in Sept 2018 in Paris crypto art show #bitcoinartrevolution (1013 points, 105 comments)
    5. Street Art treasure hunt with a Bitcoin puzzle 🎨 For the 10th birthday of the genesis block, I painted this frescoe somewhere in Paris with a 0,26btc ($1000) puzzle in it. Here's the public key: 1NqPwPp7hEXZ3Atj77Ue11xAEMmXqAXwrQ Thanks to @alistairmilne for the funds! Good luck! @pascalboyart (534 points, 135 comments)
    6. 5th fresco with a #Bitcoin QR code for donations. Thanks to the community for helping me funding my street art paintings, already 1,16 btc received till 2 years 🙏🏻🙏🏻🙏🏻 This street art piece is inspired by the autoportrait of Gustave Courbet named "The Deseperate man". Cheers! Pboy (439 points, 50 comments)

Top Commenters

  1. BashCo (4453 points, 201 comments)
  2. ebaley (4286 points, 1523 comments)
  3. diydude2 (2675 points, 745 comments)
  4. insyda86 (2675 points, 1 comment)
  5. Spartacus_Nakamoto (2452 points, 117 comments)
  6. Hanspanzer (2444 points, 727 comments)
  7. JSkeezTheGreat (2439 points, 18 comments)
  8. TheGreatMuffin (2142 points, 125 comments)
  9. ascension8438 (1970 points, 80 comments)
  10. BTCkoning (1930 points, 501 comments)

Top Submissions

  1. Quick, upvote this to confuse everyone into thinking the price jumped back up. by khaotickk (36719 points, 585 comments)
  2. I wonder if we upvote this, is there a chance trading bots get confused and start buying? by BV5A6cx9NBZU78jDGG3t (26785 points, 357 comments)
  3. Sold my portfolio today and got myself a LAMBO!!! by gth3q (16658 points, 351 comments)
  4. Upvote to get this to the top search result for "Bitcoin CEO." by cryptograffiti (15046 points, 257 comments)
  5. Those mountains by uasili4 (12386 points, 212 comments)
  6. Here we go again! Upvote to gain momentum! To the Moon! <3 by Joalwins (8846 points, 410 comments)
  7. El Chapo will most likely get LESS time than Ross Ulbricht. Let that sink in. by caro_lala (7276 points, 881 comments)
  8. Gave my sister 1 BTC for Christmas in 2013. Got this text yesterday. Warms my heart, so happy for her. by PhoenixCrypto (7250 points, 560 comments)
  9. Today in Congress Rep. Sherman called for a bill to ban all cryptocurrencies. This is the single best ad for Bitcoin that I have ever seen. Wow. This guy knows how to make us look good. by Oskar_Koch (6420 points, 889 comments)
  10. I still don't get bitcoin by cryptologodotco (6068 points, 149 comments)

Top Comments

  1. 2675 points: insyda86's comment in Sold my portfolio today and got myself a LAMBO!!!
  2. 2350 points: JSkeezTheGreat's comment in Just bought 10 BTC and I'm very proud & confident about my investment 💪
  3. 1999 points: BashCo's comment in A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words.
  4. 1818 points: pavvappav's comment in Just Got a Call from "Coinbase"
  5. 1550 points: Rellicus's comment in UPDATE: Found my lost password. It was "thisismywallet". I had taken a photo of the lost paper. What should I do with 75.9 BTC? HODL? Sell part of it?
  6. 1547 points: doubledowndope's comment in 2 years ago a man accidentally gave me 1.07 BTC. Lessons were learned.
  7. 1450 points: fiatectomy's comment in I wonder if we upvote this, is there a chance trading bots get confused and start buying?
  8. 1422 points: majani's comment in What happened the emphasis of spending bitcoin on this sub?
  9. 1218 points: MexicanRedditor's comment in Trump tweets about Bitcoin
  10. 1205 points: Chris_Jeeb's comment in Shoutout to everyone who sold yesterday
Generated with BBoe's Subreddit Stats
submitted by subreddit_stats to subreddit_stats [link] [comments]

Dmitry Khovratovich joins Dusk Network!

Dmitry is currently a principal cryptographer at Evernym, Inc. He has been an active cryptographic researcher since 2004. He developed the Equihash Proof-of-work algorithm which is currently being used as consensus mechanism for the ZCash cryptocurrency, and the Argon2 key derivation function, which won the Password Hashing Competition in July 2015.
He is the publisher of several Cryptanalysis papers for a number of mainstream cyphers, such as the first cryptanalytic attack on full-round AES-192 and AES-256 which is faster than a brute-force attack, an attack on the Radio Gatún cryptographic primitive, and also the current best cryptanalysis on Skein, a candidate for the SHA-3 competition.
In 2014, he published research about the deanonymisation of clients in the Bitcoin P2P network.
Dmitry has broken a number of ciphers and hash functions and is quoted: “Give me a system and I will find a weakness”. He is also an author of the Guru reputation system that Dusk Network will employ to ensure convergence of voting in the shortest amount of time.

submitted by Ninjaboiii12 to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

The intelligent investors guide to Particl (PART): Part 7 - Why do I believe the privacy as an option offered by Particl is superior to that offered by Monero and non-optional privacy coins?

Why does privacy as an option provide the same or better level of security as privacy by default?
From a privacy viewpoint I believe Particl provides more flexibility than Monero and other anon-only currencies as transactions can be:
This does create an initial problem for Particl in the early stages (that Monero rightly recognises) as RingCT relies on a large pool of ringCT transactions present to function properly; as not all tx have to be RingCT (since this is optional) there is a theroretical risk of deanonymisation until the pool is much larger.
However there are several workarounds possible to help increase this pool of tx early and by its very nature having a private, decentralized, anonymous marketplace functional if properly publicized, marketed and adopted should draw a large crowd of early adopters and participants to organically drive the pool up and establish a very strong level of privacy akin to monero.
The other advantage of the Particl setup is that Particl released as intended will be able to convert other cryptocurrencies to PART tokens via use of atomic swaps and widgets, one could effectively rinse their coins through monero, zcash or another anon coin, convert to a public token and then atomic swap or exchange to PART to transact anonymously again to effectively multiply the number of anonymisations a fungible chain of transactions goes through before completion.
Furthermore the in-client integration of decentralized exchanges along with in-client atomic swaps is a massive privacy advantage over Monero and other anonymous currencies where conversion to fiat or other tokens if required presently needs to pass through public exchanges both centralised and decentralised in order to complete the process of fungibility: I do not believe XMR or any anon-currency presently has a big enough ecosystem yet to exist independent of fiat.
Something which is not obvious but is interesting is that RingCT transactions on the Particl testnet are currently less intensive and more memory/space efficient than Monero's.
This has been attributed to Particl's use of a Segwit activated Bitcoin codebase rather than cryptonote protocol. Another upside of this and allowing public transactions is that it facilitates scalability of the Particl blockchain and reduces overall storage and memory demands on the node operators of the Particl network.
Thus in many ways Particl's privacy implementation is a pragmatic approach designed to faclitate freedom of choice which can offer the same level of privacy as Monero but with more features and a flexibility as well as a vision designed to facilitate adoption, scalability and non-speculative usage (i.e. the type of usage that drives real objective valuations and acts as a fiat magnet through actual usage for buying and selling of goods rather than speculative usage).
You may disagree with me and I can understand why. The approach used by Particl is pragmatic and from a pragmatists viewpoint will achieve the same end result and level of security with some acknowledged risks during development along the way. To a fundamentalist this viewpoint is unacceptable as there is no tolerance for error or possibility of it.
In practice though if you want functionality, adoption and growth, you always need to allow for flexibility and thus some room for error. We have seen this with ETH/ETC already (the economic outcome is already apparent) but history is full of examples.
As I've pointed out you do not need to force all tx through privacy mode to create a sufficiently secure privacy network if the organic demand and use of privacy is there.
This can be achieved through incentives to go private (already built into the Particl system by design), education and a solid user interface that allows users to make informed decisions about whether they want their transactions to be private or not.
With this in mind, I believe such a trade-off can overcome the developmental and implementation concerns inherent to your argument that are present and secure a network that will be beneficial to private, anonymous commerce.
To that end with a slightly more flexible approach, I personally believe the Particl client realized will offer a greater number of ways to ensure privacy than other private-currency and privacy centric decentralized solutions currently out there or in development.
Further articles in this series:
Foreword -
Part 1 -
Part 2 -
Part 3 -
Part 4 -
Part 5 -
Part 6 -
Part 7 -
Part 8 -
Full disclosure/Disclaimer: As of posting I am long Particl (PART), Ethereum (ETH), Wetrust (TRST), Augur (REP), OmiseGo (OMG) Factom (FCT) and Iconomi (ICN). All the opinions expressed are my own. I cannot guarantee gains; losses are sustainable; do your own financial research and make your decisions responsibly. All prices and values given are as of time of writing (November 2017).
submitted by joskye to Particl [link] [comments]

MAD Doge - Dark Alternatives - 6/5/2014

So it's been an interesting week, we've seen a pump, then a moderate dump recently. DogeCoin went a bit higher than it was supposed to be so we're just normalizing. Unfortunately BitCoin hasn't done much so day trading is a bit slow at the moment. A quick note for you day traders out there: Don't leave your post if you don't want to be surprised. I forgot this a week ago and sold off a decent amount before the pump, when I awoke the next day, I was stuck out of the market by 10 satoshi's.

Let's get into the Meat & Potatoes here. (Such Food Analogy, Very hungry, Much Dinner, So Soon)

The Dark Chocolate Advantage

The Dark Secrets

DogeCoin can learn from DarkCoin on some parts, but we should definitely not implement Dark Transfer Technology, why? I'll tell you tomorrow. Such Mystery?
So before I leave to get some delicious dinner (didn't I say I was anticipating it?) I'll let you suggest a tea rating for this week. At the moment, I don't see why I should change it from last weeks.
Tea: Dragon Well Longjing Green Tea. It's good stuff.
Keep holding in there fellow shibes.
submitted by DRKMSTR to MADDOGE [link] [comments]

Garrison's NCLEX Tutoring - YouTube how to create a bitcoin wallet

Title: Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network. Authors: Alex Biryukov, Dmitry Khovratovich, Ivan Pustogarov. Download PDF Abstract: Bitcoin is a digital currency which relies on a distributed set of miners to mint coins and on a peer-to-peer network to broadcast transactions. The identities of Bitcoin users are hidden behind pseudonyms (public keys) which are recommended to be ... Deanonymisation of Clients in Bitcoin P2P Network. Pages 15–29. Previous Chapter Next Chapter. ABSTRACT. Bitcoin is a digital currency which relies on a distributed set of miners to mint coins and on a peer-to-peer network to broadcast transactions. The identities of Bitcoin users are hidden behind pseudonyms (public keys) which are recommended to be changed frequently in order to increase ... Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network Alex Biryukov University of Luxembourg [email protected] Dmitry Khovratovich University of Luxembourg [email protected] Ivan Pustogarov University of Luxembourg [email protected] Abstract Bitcoin is a digital currency which relies on a distributed set of miners to mint coins and on a peer-to-peer network to broadcast ... Bitcoin is a digital currency which relies on a distributed set of miners to mint coins and on a peer-to-peer network to broadcast transactions. The identities of Bitcoin users are hidden behind pseudonyms (public keys) which are recommended to be changed frequently in order to increase transaction unlinkability. We present an efficient method to deanonymize Bitcoin users, which allows to link ... [Show full abstract] encourages users to connect to the Bitcoin network through anonymizers like Tor and motivates development of default Tor functionality for popular mobile SPV clients. In this ...

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Garrison's NCLEX Tutoring - YouTube

bitcoin, how-to (media genre), first, little, free, your, bitcoin wallets, bitcoin how to, how to make a bitcoin wallet, how to get bitcoins, bitcoins, free bitcoins, bitcoins for free, noah ... For tutoring please call 856.777.0840 I am a registered nurse who helps nursing students pass their NCLEX. I have been a nurse since 1997. I have worked in a lot of nursing fields and I truly love ... Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network by Alex Biryukov, Dmitry Khovratovich, ... Dandelion: Redesigning the bitcoin network for anonymity by Shaileshh Bojja Venkatakrishnan, Giulia ...